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Abstract
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payos by
cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities
{or simply a TU-game. A value function for TU-games is a function that assigns
to every game a distribution of the payos. A value function is ecient if for
every game it exactly distributes the worth that can be obtained by all players
cooperating together.
An approach to eciently allocating the worth of the `grand coalition' is
using share functions which assign to every game a vector which components
sum up to one such that every component is the corresponding players' share in
the total payo that is to be distributed among the players. In this paper we give
some characterizations of a class of share functions containing the Shapley share
function and the Banzhaf share function using generalizations of potentials and
of Hart and Mas-Colell's reduced game property.
1 Introduction
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payos by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities {or simply a TU-game{
being a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a nite set of players and v: 2N ! IR
is a characteristic function on N such that v(;) = 0. We denote the collection of all
TU-games by G.
A value function on C  G is a function f that assigns to every (N; v) 2
C an n-dimensional real vector f(N; v) 2 IRn representing a distribution of payos
among the players. A value function f is ecient on C  G if for every game in C
it exactly distributes the worth v(N) of the `grand coalition' over all players, i.e., ifP
i2N fi(N; v) = v(N) for every (N; v) 2 C. An example of an ecient value function
is the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), and an example of a value function that is
not ecient is the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965)) which is characterized in, e.g.,
Lehrer (1988) and Haller (1994). Since the Banzhaf value is not ecient it is not
adequate in allocating the worth v(N) of the `grand coalition'. In order to allocate v(N)
according to the Banzhaf value van den Brink and van der Laan (1998a) characterized
the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the worth v(N) proportional to the
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Banzhaf values of the players. This normalized Banzhaf value does not satisfy some
important properties that are used in characterizing the Banzhaf value.
An alternative approach to eciently allocating the worth v(N) of the `grand
coalition' is the concept of share functions as introduced in van der Laan and van den
Brink (1998). A share vector for game (N; v) 2 G is an n-dimensional real vector
 2 IRn such that
P
i2N i = 1. Here i is player i's share in the total payo that is to
be distributed among the players. A share function on C  G is a function that assigns
to every (N; v) 2 C exactly one share vector (N; v) 2 IRn.
The share function corresponding to the Shapley value dened on the class of
games (N; v) for which v(N) 6= 0 is the Shapley share function which is obtained
by dividing the Shapley value of each player by the sum of the Shapley values of all
players (being equal to v(N) since the Shapley value is ecient). Similarly, the Banzhaf
share function is obtained by dividing the Banzhaf or normalized Banzhaf value by the
corresponding sum of payos over all players. Note that, although the Banzhaf and
normalized Banzhaf value are very dierent as argued above, they correspond to the
same Banzhaf share function.
In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) a class of share functions that gen-
eralizes the Shapley- and the Banzhaf share function is characterized. Purpose of this
paper is to give two other characterizations of this class. First we generalize the concept
of potential function as introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989), yielding a class
of potential functions such that their normalized marginal functions each correspond
to a share function in the class of share functions mentioned above. Using this we
also show how these share functions can be obtained from one another by adequately
transforming games. In particular, we show how each share function in this class can
be obtained as the Shapley share function of a transformed game.
Using this generalized concept of a potential function we give another charac-
terization of the class of share functions considered. First we adapt the reduced games
by Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) in characterizing the Shapley value, and Dragan
(1996a,b) in characterizing the Banzhaf value to reduced games for share function-
s. Then we generalize these reduced games and use these to characterize other share
functions.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries on TU-
games. In particular, we discuss the class of share functions and its characterization
mentioned above. In Section 3 we characterize this class of share functions by con-
sidering generalized potential functions and their normalized marginal functions. In
Section 4 we give a characterization of the class of share functions considered using
reduced games. Finally, in Section 5 we make some concluding remarks on the relation
between share functions and share mappings being mappings R that assign to every
(N; v) 2 C  G a set of share vectors R(N; v)  IRn.
2 Preliminaries on TU-games and share functions
In this section we give some preliminary concepts and denitions on cooperative games.
For given N and nonempty T  N the unanimity game (N;uT ) is given by uT (E) = 1
if T  E and uT (E) = 0 otherwise, E  N .1 From Harsanyi (1959) we know that the
characteristic function v of a game (N; v) can be expressed as a linear combination of the








where jSj denotes the number of elements of the set S.
A TU-game (N; v) is calledmonotone if v(E)  v(F ) for all E  F  N and it is
called convex if for every pair E; F  N it holds that v(E[F )+v(E\F )  v(E)+v(F ).
Observe that any unanimity game is monotone and convex. For a given game (N; v) 2 G
and given T  N , the restriction of (N; v) to T is denoted by the subgame (T; vT ) and
is given by vT (E) = v(E) for all E  T . The class C  G is called subgame closed if
for every (N; v) 2 C and every T  N it holds that (T; vT ) 2 C. Examples of subgame
closed classes of games are the class of all games G, the class of all monotone games,
and the class of all convex games. Note that a class of games with a xed player set is
not subgame closed.
A game (N; v) is called a null game if v = v0 with v0(E) = 0 for all E  N . To
conclude these preliminaries, let :G ! IR be a function assigning a real value to any
1Note that we ignore the unanimity games (N; u;). In the paper, when we speak about unanimity
games we mean unanimity games (N; uT ) with T 6= ;.
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game (N; v) 2 G. The function :G ! IR is positive on C  G if (N; v) > 0 for all
(N; v) 2 C, and it is called zero on C  G if (N; v) = 0 for all (N; v) 2 C. By G+  G,
respectively G0  G, we denote the class of games on which  is positive, respectively




, i.e. (N; v)  0 for all (N; v) 2 G  G. We
call a function :G ! IR additive on C if for every pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 C
such that2 (N; v + w) 2 C it holds that (N; v + w) = (N; v) + (N;w). A function
:G ! IR is linear on C if it is additive on C and for every (N; v) 2 C and c 2 IR such
that (N; cv) 2 C it holds that (N; cv) = c(N; v). Finally, we call :G ! IR sym-
metric on C if for every (N; v) 2 C, every pair of symmetric players i; j in (N; v) 3 and
every E  N; E  fi; jg, such that the subgames (E nfig; vEnfig) and (E nfjg; vEnfjg)
are in C, it holds that (E n fig; vEnfig) = (E n fjg; vEnfjg).
We now recall some well-known solution concepts for cooperative games that
are mentioned in the introduction. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is the value





(jEj   1)!(n  jEj)!
n!
miE(N; v) for all i 2 N;
where miE(N; v) = v(E) v(E nfig) is the marginal contribution of player i to coalition
E  N in (N; v) 2 G. As mentioned in the introduction the Shapley value is an ecient
value function.
A value function that is not ecient is the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965)) being







miE(N; v) for all i 2 N:
In order to eciently allocate v(N) according to the Banzhaf value the normalized
2For a pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 G the game (N; v+w) is given by (v+w)(E) = v(E) +w(E)
for all E  N .
3Players i; j 2 N are symmetric in (N; v) 2 G if v(E n fig) = v(E n fjg) for all E  N with
E  fi; jg.
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Banzhaf value b given by
b(N; v) = v(N)P
j2N j(N; v)
(N; v)
can be used. Thus, the normalized Banzhaf value allocates v(N) proportional to the
Banzhaf values of the players.
A general approach to eciently allocating payos in TU-games is using share functions
which are introduced in van der Laan and van den Brink (1998). A share function on
a set of games C  G is a function  that assigns to every game (N; v) 2 C an n-
dimensional real vector (N; v) 2 IRn such that the shares assigned to the players sum
up to one for every game in C, i.e.
P
i2N i(N; v) = 1 for all (N; v) 2 C. The i
th
component is the share of player i 2 N in the value to be distributed, e.g., in v(N).
Three properties that can be satised by such share functions are the following4.
The rst two properties are similar to the null player and symmetry properties
for value functions. The share function  satises the null player property on C if for
every (N; v) 2 C and every null player 5 i in (N; v) it holds that i(N; v) = 0. Share
fuction  satises symmetry on C if for every (N; v) 2 C and every pair i; j of symmetric
players in (N; v) it holds that i(N; v) = j(N; v). Finally, for some function :G ! IR,
the share function  satises -additivity on C if for every pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2
C such that (N; v + w) 2 C it holds that (N; v + w)(N; v + w) = (N; v)(N; v) +
(N;w)(N;w). This last property is a generalization of the additivity property which
is obtained by taking (N; v) = 1 for all (N; v) 2 G. Although additivity is a reasonable
property of value functions it does not make sense for share functions. However, a
share function that satises -additivity for an additive -function satises some kind
of weighted additivity property in the sense that the shares assigned to the sum game
of two games is a convex combination of the shares assigned to the two separate games.
This can easily be seen by rewriting -addivity for an additive -function as (N; v +
w) = (N;v)
(N;v)+(N;w)
(N; v) + (N;w)
(N;v)+(N;w)
(N;w). So,  determines the weights of the
4In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) ecient shares (meaning that the components of
i(N; v) sum up to one for all (N; v) 2 C is taken as a fourth axiom. In this paper we have taken this
into our denition of a share function.
5Player i 2 N is a null player in (N; v) 2 G if v(E) = v(E n fig) for all E  N .
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games in this convex combination. What weights are appropriate depends on the
application we have in mind. Here, we only require  to be additive.
The following theorem6 characterizes a class of share functions on subclasses
of games C  G containing all positively scaled unanimity games (N;uT ), T  N ,
 > 0, i.e. uT (E) =  if T  E, and uT (E) = 0 otherwise. Examples of classes of
games that contain all positively scaled unanimity games are the class of all games G,
the class of all monotone games, and the class of all convex games.
Theorem 2.1 (van der Laan and van den Brink (1998))
(i) Let :G ! IR be positive and symmetric on a subclass C  G that contains all
positively scaled unanimity games. Then there exists a unique share function  on
C satisfying the null player property, symmetry and -additivity if and only if  is
additive on C.
(ii) For given positive vectors !n 2 IRn+; n 2 IN, for all n 2 IN, let the function
:G ! IR be dened by (N; v) = !
n
(N; v), where !
n



























for every i 2 N;






The second part of the theorem shows that any choice of positive weights on the
marginal contributions (with equal weights assigned to coalitions of equal size) denes





n . Note that all functions !
n
are positive on all positively scaled unanimity games.
6In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) results are stated more general for classes of games
with xed player set.
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Alternatively, for n = (n1 ; : : : ; 
n
n) 2 IR
n, n 2 IN, a vector of real numbers, consider
the function :G ! IR dened by (N; v) = 
n
(N; v), where 
n







i.e. n is a vector of weights putted to the worths v(E), E  N , of the characteristic
function. In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) it is shown that !
n
(N; v) is equal
to 
n






t   (n   t)!
n
t+1; t = n  1; : : : ; 1:
Observe that for arbitrarily chosen positive numbers !nt , t = 1; : : : ; n, some of the




) satisfy the properties of additivity and symmetry for any positive
vector !n (respectively the corresponding vector n) of weights.
Examples of  functions dened by a vector n of weights are the function
S :G ! IR given by S(N; v) = v(N) (with nn = 1 and 
n
t = 0 for t = 1; : : : ; n   1),
and B:G ! IR given by B(N; v) = 1
2n 1
P
EN (2jEj   n)v(E) (with 
n
t = (2t  
n)2 (n 1); t = 1; : : : ; n). In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) it is shown that
the unique share function satisfying the properties stated in Theorem 2.1 with  = S
is the Shapley share function S given by
Si (N; v) =
Shi(N; v)
v(N)
for all i 2 N;
on the class of games (N; v) 2 G with v(N) 6= 0, and the unique share function
satisfying these properties with  = B is the Banzhaf share function B given by













for all i 2 N
on the class of games (N; v) for which
P
j2N j(N; v) 6= 0. This can be seen by noting
that taking nn = 1 and 
n
t = 0 for t = 1; : : : ; n 1 and solving system (2) for the vector
!n gives the Shapley weights !nt =
(t 1)!(n t)!
n!
, t = 1; : : : ; n, which gives us the Shapley
share function by applying Theorem 2.1.(ii). Also, taking nt = (2t   n)2
 (n 1); t =
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1; : : : ; n and solving system (2) for the vector !n gives the Banzhaf weights !nt = 2
 (n 1)
for t = 1; : : : ; n, which gives us the Banzhaf share function by applying part (ii) of
Theorem 2.1.
Besides the Shapley and Banzhaf share functions, other share functions can be
obtained by particular choices of weight vectors !. We illustrate this by two examples.








, i 2 N ,
where 'DP is the non-ecient Deegan-Packel value (Deegan and Packel (1979)) given
by






for all i 2 N:
This share function satises the axioms of symmetry and T -additivity with T (N; v) =P
EN v(E), i.e. 
T measures the sum of the worths of all coalitions of N . But it does
not satisfy the null player property and thus does not belong to the class of share
functions discussed above. However, according to Theorem 2.1 there exists a unique
share function on G+
T
satisfying symmetry, T -additivity and the null player property.
Again, taking t = 1, t = 1; : : : ; n and and solving system (3) for the vector ! gives






, t = n  1; : : : ; 1. Then the share function T
is found by using these weights in part (ii) of Theorem 2.1.
Another alternative would be to take M (N; v) = nv(N)  
P
i2N v(N n fig) =
(N; v) with weights n = n, n 1 =  1 and t = 0, t = 1; : : : ; n  2, or equivalently
M (N; v) = !(N; v) with weights !n = 1 and !t = 0, t = n   1; : : : ; 1. The corre-
sponding share function M on G+
M
satisfying the null player property, symmetry and
M -additivity is obtained by applying the vector ! of weights in the second part of
Theorem 2.1. (Although not all weights are positive, note that the class G+
M
contains
all unanimity games, which is sucient to apply Theorem 2.1.) The share function M
distributes the shares proportional to the marginal contributions miN(N; v) of the play-
ers to the `grand coalition' N , and thus is related to the class of compromise values such
as the  -value (Tijs (1981)) (Note that the  -share function  which assigns shares
proportional to the  -value satises the axioms of null player property and symmetry,
but there is no additive -function such that  is -additivite.)
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We conclude this section by extending Theorem 2.1.(i) from subclasses of the class G+
of -positive games to subclasses of the set G, so allowing for games to which the
function  assigns the value zero. The next corollary follows immediately from part (i)
of Theorem 2.1 by requiring that  satises the equal share property in case (N; v) is
a game with (N; v) = 0, i.e. i (N; v) =
1
n
for all i 2 N when (N; v) 2 C \ G0.
Corollary 2.2 Let :G ! IR be additive and symmetric on G, and let C  G be a
subgame closed set containing all positively scaled unanimity games. Then there exists
a unique share function  on C satisfying (i) symmetry and -additivity on C, (ii) the
null player property on C \ G+ , and (iii) the equal share property on C \ G
0

In a similar way the second part of Theorem 2.1 can be extended to subclasses of G.
3 Potential functions
In the previous section we discussed share functions, restated the characterization of
a class of share functions from van der Laan and van den Brink (1998), and gave
a denition of these share functions using marginal share vectors. In this section
we take another approach to share functions by generalizing the concept of potential
functions as introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989). Hart and Mas-Colell
dene a potential function on a subclass C of G to be a function P : C ! IR satisfying




P (N; v)  P (N n fig; vNnfig)

= v(N):
Hart and Mas-Colell show that there exists a unique potential function on C  G, when
C is a subgame closed set of games. They also show that the vector function DP on C
of marginals dened by DPi(N; v) = P (N; v) P (N nfig; vNnfig), i 2 N , is the Shapley
value function. Using -functions as introduced in the previous section we generalize
the concept of potential function as follows.
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Denition 3.1 Let C  G be subgame closed. Then, for given :G ! IR, a function
P : C ! IR is a -potential function on C if P (N; v) = 0 whenever N = ;, and for




P (N; v)  P (N n fig; vNnfig)

= (N; v): (3)
Clearly, P  is the Hart and Mas-Colell potential function when the function  is taken
to be the Shapley -function S which assigns to every TU-game (N; v) the worth v(N)
of the grand coalition7. For given function :G ! IR, in the remaining of this section
we restrict our analysis to subgame closed subsets C of the class of games G. For
C  G, we dene C
+ = C \ G+ and C
0 = C \ G0. Now, for given -potential function
P  on a subgame closed set C  G we dene the marginal function DP
 on C by
DP

i (N; v) = P
(N; v)  P (N n fig; vNnfig); i 2 N; (4)
and the normalized marginal function NDP  on C by
NDP









if (N; v) 2 C+
1
n
if (N; v) 2 C0
9=
; ; i 2 N: (5)
We will prove that for given function :G ! IR and subgame closed set C  G, the
normalized marginal function on C characterizes the corresponding share function  on
C satisfying the conditions of Corollary 2.2 when the -function satises an additional
property, namely the property of null player independency. This property states that
deleting a null player from a game does not change the value assigned by the -function.
Denition 3.2 The function :G ! IR is null player independent on C  G if for
every (N; v) 2 C and every null player i in (N; v) such that (N n fig; vNnfig) 2 C it
holds that (N; v) = (N n fig; vNnfig).
7Calvo and Santos (1997) consider value functions  on the class of all games for which there
exists a function P from the class of games to the real numbers such that  i(N; v) = P (N; v)  
P (N n fig; vNnfig). They show that such a P exists if and only if  (N; v) =  (N; v ) where v 
is the characteristic function which is determined by  itself by assigning to every E  N the sumP
i2E  i(N; v).
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Further, we only consider functions  that assign the value zero to null games. We
now state the following result.
Theorem 3.3 Let :G ! IR with (N; v0) = 0 for every set of players N , be additive,
symmetric, and null player independent on G, and let C  G be a subgame closed set
containing all positively scaled unanimity games. Then there exists a unique -potential
function P  on C. The corresponding normalized marginal function NDP  is equal to
the unique share function  on C satisfying the properties of Corollary 2.2.
Proof
Since P (N; v) = 0 if N = ;, the potential P (N; v), n  1, is uniquely determined by
recursively using equation (3) and is given by







P (N n fig; vNnfig)
!
: (6)
From the denition of the corresponding normalized marginal function given in equa-
tion (5) it follows that NDP (N; v) = (N; v) = 1
n
if (N; v) 2 C0. To prove that
NDP (N; v) = (N; v) for all (N; v) 2 C it is sucient to show that NDP  is a share
function and satises the null player property on C+, symmetry and -additivity, since
Corollary 2.2 says that there is a unique share function satisfying these properties.
From the equations (3), (4) and (5) it follows immediately that the components
of NDP  add up to one and thus it is a share function. To prove the null player property
on C+, let i 2 N be a null player in (N; v) 2 C. First, take N = fig and hence v = v0
because i is a null player. From equation (3) and P (;; v) = 0 for all v we obtain that
DP

i (N; v) = P
(fig; v)  P (;; v;) = (fig; v) = (fig; v
0) = 0:
Hence, DP i (N; v) = 0 when n = 1 and i is a null player. Proceeding by induction
assume that for some given integer k  1 and for any game (N 0; v) 2 C with i 2 N 0 a
null player and jN 0j = k, it holds that DP i (N
0; v) = 0, and let N be such that N 0  N
and n = k+1. Using the induction hypotheses with N 0 = N nfjg for all j 2 N nfig we
obtain that for given n-player game (N; v) with the induced restricted (n   1)-player
11
games (N n fjg; vNnfjg) (in which player i is a null player) it holds that
nDP

i (N; v) = DP

















i (N n fjg; vNnfjg)












P (N n fig; vNnfig)  P
(N n fi; jg; vNnfi;jg)

= (N; v)   (N n fig; vNnfig):
Hence, null player independency of  implies that for every (N; v) 2 C it holds that




(N; v)  (N n fig; vNnfig)

= 0;
when i is a null player in (N; v), and thus NDP i (N; v) = 0 for (N; v) 2 C
+, which
shows that the null player property is true on C+.
To prove the symmetry property we show that for every (N; v) 2 C it holds that
NDP

i (N; v) = NDP

j (N; v), when i and j are two symmetric players in (N; v). So,
let i; j 2 N be two symmetric players in (N; v) 2 G. For N = fi; jg it follows
with P (;; v) = 0 and the symmetry of  that P (N n fig; vNnfig) = P
(fjg; vfjg) =
(fjg; vfjg) = (fig; vfig) = P
(fig; vfig) = P
(N nfjg; vNnfjg). Hence, NDP

i (N; v) =
NDP j (N; v). Proceeding by induction assume that for some given integer k  2 and for
any game (N 0; v) 2 C with i; j 2 N 0 and jN 0j = k, it holds that P (N 0 n fig; vN 0nfig) =
P (N 0 n fjg; vN 0nfjg) and let N be such that N
0  N and n = k + 1. Using symmetry
of  and the induction hypotheses with N 0 = N n fhg for all h 2 N n fi; jg we obtain
that for given n-player game (N; v) with the induced restricted (n   1)-player games
(N n fhg; vNnfhg) it holds that




@(N n fig; vNnfig) + X
h2Nnfig







@(N n fjg; vNnfjg) + X
h2Nnfig




= P (N n fjg; vNnfjg):
So, for every (N; v) 2 C and two symmetric players i; j 2 N it holds that DP i (N; v) =
P (N; v) P (N n fig; vNnfig) = P
(N; v) P (N n fjg; vNnfjg) = DP

j (N; v). Hence,
NDP

i (N; v) = NDP

j (N; v).
Finally we prove -additivity of NDP . For (N; v); (N;w) 2 C with n = 1 it holds that
P (N; v+w) = (N; v+w) = (N; v)+(N;w) = P (N; v)+P (N;w) by additivity of
. Proceeding by induction assume that for some given integer k  1 and for any pair
(N 0; v); (N 0; w) 2 C with jN 0j = k, it holds P (N 0; v + w) = P (N 0; v) + P (N 0; w).
Then for N with n = k + 1, it follows from the additivity of  and the induction
hypothesis for all N 0 = N n fjg for all j 2 N , that




(N; v + w) +
X
i2N












P (N n fig; vNnfig) + P
(N n fig; wNnfig)

= P (N; v) + P (N;w):
With equation (4) it then follows that DP (N; v + w) = DP (N; v) +DP (N;w), and
thus
(N; v + w)NDP (N; v + w) = (N; v)NDP (N; v) + (N;w)NDP (N;w)
when both (N; v); (N;w) 2 C+. If both games belong to C0 then additivity of  implies
that (N; v + w) = 0, and thus again -additivity holds. Finally, in case one of the
games belong to C0 and the other to C+, say (N; v) 2 C0 and (N;w) 2 C+, then addi-
tivity of  implies that (N; v + w) = (N;w) > 0, and as shown above DP (N; v +
w) = DP (N; v) + DP (N;w) = DP (N;w), and thus (N; v + w)NDP (N; v +
w) = DP (N; v + w) = DP (N;w) = (N;w)NDP (N;w) = (N; v)NDP (N; v) +
(N;w)NDP (N;w). Hence, -additivity holds for any pair (N; v); (N;w) 2 C. 2
Examples of additive, symmetric and null player independent -functions are the
functions S(N; v) = v(N), B(N; v) = 1
2n 1
P
EN (2jEj   n)v(E) and 





N (N; v) as dened in the previous section. So, Theorem 3.3 holds for 
S , B and
M . The function T (N; v) =
P
EN v(E) is additive and symmetric, but not null play-
er independent. However, Theorem 3.3 also holds for T since this share function also
can be obtained using the null player independent function T (N; v) = 1
2n 1
T (N; v).
Corollary 3.4 The share functions S, B, T and M are equal to the normalized









Observe that the Shapley share function S is equal to the normalized marginal function
NDP  on G by taking (N; v) = v(N) in Denition 3.1 of the -potential function.
From this it follows that for every share function corresponding to an additive, sym-
metric, and null player independent -function it holds that the vector of shares of a
game (N; v) 2 G is equal to the vector of Shapley shares of the transformed game
(N; v) dened by v(E) = (E; vE) for all E  N .
Theorem 3.5 Let :G ! IR with (N; v0) = 0 for every set of players N , be additive,
symmetric, and null player independent on G, let C  G be a subgame closed set
contain all positively scaled unanimity games and let  be the unique share function
on C satisfying the properties of Corollary 2.2. Then for every (N; v) 2 C it holds that
(N; v) 2 GS and that 
(N; v) = S(N; v).
Proof
First, let (N; v) 2 C  G. Since 
S(N; v) = v(N) = (N; v)  0, it follows that
(N; v) 2 GS . Next we show that 
(N; v) = S(N; v). First consider the case that
(N; v) is a null game and thus also all subgames (E; vE), E  N , are null games. Then
by denition i (N; v) =
1
n
for all i 2 N . Furthermore we have that (N; v) is a null





for all i 2 N .
To prove the theorem for all games in C we show that the function  dened
by (N; v) = S(N; v) for all E  N is a share function and satises symmetry
and -additivity on C, and the null player property on C+. Since the share function
satisfying these properties is unique we must then have that (N; v) = (N; v) for
any (N; v) 2 C  G. That  is a share function follows immediately from the fact
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that S is a share function. Let i 2 N be a null player in (N; v) 2 C+. Then the
assumption of null player independence of  implies that i is a null player in (N; v),
and thus i(N; v) = 
S
i (N; v
) = 0. Further, let i; j 2 N be symmetric players in
(N; v) 2 C. Then symmetry of  implies that i and j are symmetric in (N; v), and
thus i(N; v) = 
S
i (N; v
) = Sj (N; v
) = j(N; v).
To show the -additivity of , note that for (N; v); (N;w) 2 C, by the additivity
of  and using (v + w) = v + w we obtain that
(N; v + w)(N; v + w) = (N; v + w)S(N; (v + w)) = (N; v + w)S(N; v + w):
If at least one of the games (N; v); (N;w) belong to C+ we obtain by S -additivity of
S , and the fact that S(N; (v + z)) = (v + z)(N) = (N; v + z) > 0, that
(N; v + w)(N; v + w) = (N; v + w)
 
S(N; v)S(N; v) + S(N;w)S(N;w)
S(N; (v + z))
!
= (N; v + w)
 
v(N)(N; v) + w(N)(N;w)
(v + z)(N)
!
= (N; v + w)
 
(N; v)(N; v) + (N;w)(N;w)
(N; v + w)
!
= (N; v)(N; v) + (N;w)(N;w):
In case that both (N; v); (N;w) 2 C0, additivity of  and (N; v) = (N;w) = 0 imply
that (N; v + w) = 0, and thus -additivity is satised. 2
We illustrate this theorem with an example.




0 if E 2 ff1g; f2g; f3g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg
1 if E 2 ff1; 2gg
2 if E = f1; 2; 3g:






(E; vE) f1g f2g f3g f1; 2g f1; 3g f2; 3g f1; 2; 3g
S(E; vE) 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
B(E; vE) 0 0 0 1 0 0
7
4
T (E; vE) 0 0 0 1 0 0 3





M (E; vE) 0 0 0 2 0 0 5


















(2; 2; 1) = M (N; v):




(7; 7; 4) 6= T (N; v).
In Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) it is shown that the potential function
P :G ! IR as dened in the beginning of this section is given by
P (N; v) =
X
EN
(n  jEj)!(jEj   1)!
n!
v(E);
i.e. P (N; v) is a weighted sum of the payos given in the characteristic function
and where the weights are given by the Shapley weights in the Shapley -function








miE(N; v) written as the weighted sum of
all marginal contributions. Theorem 3.5 enables us to generalize the result of Hart
and Mas-Colell for -functions being a weighted sum of the marginal contributions
with positive weights !njEj, E  N , i.e. for functions 
!n:G ! IR as dened in Theo-










E(N; v) for a vector !
n of positive
weights. Note that such a !
n
-function is additive and symmetric on G by denition.
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The next corollary shows that the !
n
-potential function corresponding to a null play-
er independent function !
n
can be seen as a weighted sum of worths of coalitions
with corresponding marginal contribution weights !njEj, E  N . The corollary follows
directly from Theorem 3.5 and the result of Hart and Mas-Colell.
Corollary 3.7 For given vector !n = (!n1 ; : : : ; !
n
n); n 2 IN; of positive weights, let 
!n










E(N; v). If 
!n is null player independent on
a subgame closed set C  G!n , then the 
!n-potential function P 
!
n








For a given value function f on G, Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) have introduced
their concept of a reduced game of (N; v) for any nonempty coalition T  N . To
distinguish this notion from other concepts of reduced games we will speak about
the HM-f -reduced game. For (N; v) 2 G and T  N nonempty, the HM-f -reduced
game of coalition T is dened implicitly as the game (T; vT;f) satisfying the conditions
vT;f(;) = 0 and




c; vE[T c); E  T; E 6= ;;
where T c = N n T . Using this concept of reduced game, Hart and Mas-Colell (1988,
1989) stated an alternative characterization of the Shapley value. A characterization of
the Banzhaf value in terms of a similar kind of reduced game has been given in Dragan
(1996a,b).
In this section we will give similar characterizations for the Shapley and Banzhaf
share functions. First, for given share function  on G and function :G ! IR, the
concept of HM-f -reduced game is generalized by dening implicitly for each (N; v) 2 G
and nonempty set T  N the HM-(; )-reduced game (T; vT;;) of coalition T as the
game that satises vT;;(;) = 0 and








A ; E  T;
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when E 6= ;. Since  is a share function we have that
P
i2F i(F; vF ) = 1 for every
game (F; vF ). Applying this with F = E [ T
c this equation can be rewritten as





c; vE[T c); E  T: (7)
Before characterizing share functions using reduced game properties we rst have to dis-
cuss certain properties of HM-(; )-reduced games. From Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)
it follows that for  = S and  = S the HM-(S; S)-reduced games (T; vT;
S;S) exist
and are uniquely determined on G. However, both the existence and uniqueness result
do not hold for arbitrary chosen share function  on G and function :G ! IR, as is
shown in the next examples.
Example 4.1 Take  = S the Shapley share function and let :G ! IR be given
by (N; v) =
P
i2N v(fig). Consider the game (N; v) 2 G given by N = f1; 2; 3g,






(fig) = (fig; vT;;
S
fig ) = (fi; 3g; vfi;3g)
S






(fig) = (T; vT;;
S
) = (N; v)












Clearly, this contradicts the existence of a HM-(; S)-reduced game (T; vT;;
S
).
Example 4.2 Take  = S the Shapley share function and let :G ! IR be given
by (N; v) = maxEN v(E). Consider the game (N; v) 2 G given by N = f1; 2; 3g,






fig ) = (fi; 3g; vfi;3g)
S




) = (N; v)





= 1 0 = 0:
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Clearly, all games (T; v) with v(fig) = 0, i = 1; 2 and v(T ) = v(f1; 2g)  0 satisfy
these conditions and hence the HM-(; S)-reduced game (T; vT;;
S
) is not uniquely
determined.
Thus, in general HM-(; )-reduced games need not exist nor be unique. However, it
turns out that they are uniquely determined on G if  is linear on G and is positive for
all unanimity games.
Theorem 4.3 Let  be a share function on G and let :G ! IR be linear on G and
positive for all unanimity games. Then for all (N; v) 2 G and T  N , the HM-(; )-
reduced games (T; vT;;) are uniquely determined on G.
Proof
For given (N; v) 2 G, T  N , a share function  on G and a linear function  on G
being positive for all unanimity games, let (T; vT;;) 2 G be a HM-(; )-reduced game
for the coalition T . To show the existence and uniqueness of (T; vT;;), we prove by
induction on jEj that there exist unique dividends v;T; (E), E  T .
















is uniquely determined. Proceeding by induction,
assume that for some given integer k  1 and for any F  T with jF j  k we have
determined the dividends vT;; (F ), and let E  T be such that jEj = k + 1. By
denition any HM-(; )-reduced game (T; vT;;) satises













(F )(E; uF ), and by (E; uE) >














(F )(E; uF )
(E; uE)
=
(E [ T c; v(E[T c))
P




























(E) is uniquely determined. Hence all the dividends vT;;(E) = vT;;
E
(E)
exist and are uniquely determined and therefore it holds that all the values vT;;(E) =P
FE v;T;(E)u
F (E) exist and are uniquely determined for all E  T , and so are
(T; vT;;) for all T  N . 2
Theorem 4.3 implies that all HM-(; )-reduced games (T; vT;;) are uniquely deter-
mined in G for all (N; v) in the class of games considered in the next lemma which
expresses the -potential funtions of the subgames of a HM-(; )-reduced game as the
dierence of potential functions of subgames of the original game. (This lemma will
be used later on to show the `consistency' of certain share functions.)
Lemma 4.4 Let :G ! IR with (N; v0) = 0 for every set of players N , be linear,
symmetric, null player independent and positive for all unanimity games, and let  be
the corresponding share function as given in Corollary 2.2 on a subgame closed class
C  G containing all positively scaled unanimity games. Then for all (N; v) 2 C,
T  N and E  T such that (E [ T c; v(E[T c)) > 0 it holds that
P (E; vT;;

E ) = P
(E [ T c; vE[T c)  P
(T c; vT c): (8)
Proof
We prove the lemma by induction on jEj. If jEj = 0 then both sides of equality (8)




E ) = (E; v
;T;
E ) = (E [ T
c; v(E[T c))

i (E [ T
c; v(E[T c)):
Applying Theorem 3.3 and using the equations (4) and (5) this yields
P (E; vT;;

E ) = (E [ T
c; v(E[T c))NDP

i (E [ T
c; v(E[T c))
= DP i (E [ T
c; v(E[T c)) = P
(E [ T c; v(E[T c))  P
(T c; vT c):
Proceeding by induction assume that for some given integer k  1 and for any E0  T
with jE0j = k we have shown that the equality holds for (E0; v;T;

), and let jEj = k+1.
For every i 2 E the induction hypothesis then implies that
P (E n fig; vT;;

Enfig ) = P
((E [ T c) n fig; v(E[T c)nfig)  P
(T c; vT c):
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P ((E [ T c) n fig; v(E[T c)nfig)

 




P (E [ T c; vE[T c)  P







P (E n fig; vT;;

Enfig )  P
((E [ T c) n fig; v(E[T c)nfig)

+





i (E [ T
c; vE[T c))  (E [ T









P (E n fig; vT;;

Enfig )  P
((E [ T c) n fig; v(E[T c)nfig)

 





i (E [ T








 P (T c; vT c) =  jEjP
(T c; vT c);
so that P (E; vT;;

E ) = P
(E [ T c; vE[T c)  P
(T c; vT c). 2
For given function  on G, in the previous sections we have restricted ourselves
to subclasses of G to characterize the corresponding share function 
. Theorem 4.3
says that for given  the HM-(; )-reduced game is uniquely determined if  on G
is linear and positive for all unanimity games. However, when we take (N; v) 2 G,
Theorem 4.3 does not imply that also the corresponding HM-(; )-reduced games are
in G, as is illustrated in the following example
8.
8The same can be said about other classes of games such as the class of all monotone games.
In a similar way as in the example below it can be shown that, for example, the HM-(S ; S)-
reduced game (T; vT;
S;S ) with T = f1; 2g of the monotone game (N; v) given by N = f1; 2; 3g and
v = uf1;3g + uf2;3g   uf1;2;3g is not monotone.
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Example 4.5 Take  = S the Shapley share function and (N; v) = S(N; v) =
v(N). Consider the class GS and (N; v) 2 GS given byN = f1; 2; 3g, v = 2u
f3g uf1;2g,












i (fi; 3g; vfi;3g) = vfi;3g(fi; 3g)
S
i (fi; 3g; vfi;3g) = 2 0 = 0; i = 1; 2;
and
vT;
S;S(T ) = vT;
S;S
T (T ) = 
S(T; vT;
S;S) =
S(N; v)(S1 (N; v) + 
S
2 (N; v)) = v(N)





= 1  ( 1) =  1:
Thus, S(T; vT;
S;S ) < 0, and (T; vT;
S;S) 62 GS .
For given  and , in the following we consider (; )-closed subclasses of the class of
games G.
Denition 4.6 For given  and  on G, a subset C of G is (; )-closed if it is
subgame closed and for every (N; v) 2 C and every T  N it holds that the HM-(; )-
reduced game (T; vT;;) 2 C.
This denition implies that when C is a (; )-closed subset of G for every T  N it
holds that (T; vT )  0 and (E; v
T;;
E )  0 for all E  T . Recall from Theorem 4.3
that all HM-(; )-reduced games exist and are uniquely determined, when  is linear
on G and positive for all unanimity games. We now prove the following property.
Lemma 4.7 For  linear on G and positive for all unanimity games, and share func-
tion  on G, let C  G be (; )-closed. Then for every (N; v) 2 C with (N; v) > 0 it
holds that i(N; v)  0 for all i 2 N .
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Proof
Since C is (; )-closed for every (N; v) 2 C we have that (T; vT;;) 2 C and hence
(T; vT;;)  0 for every T  N . For given (N; v) 2 G with (N; v) > 0, take i 2 N .
Applying equation (7) for E = T = fig yields
(T; vT;;) = (N; v)i(N; v):
Hence i(N; v)  0. 2
The proof of the lemma also implies that a subset C  G can only be (; )-closed
when for every (N; v) 2 C with (N; v) positive the share vector is nonnegative. Clearly,
when i(N; v) < 0 for some i 2 N , then (fig; v
fig;;) = (N; v)i(N; v) < 0 and hence
(fig; vfig;;) 62 C.
We now come to characterizing share functions using reduced game properties. We s-
tate the following reduced game property, which says that for given function :G ! IR
and given share function , a (possibly dierent) share function  satises the HM-
(; )-reduced game property on a subgame closed subset C of G if for any (N; v) 2 C,
for all T  N and for every pair of two players i; j 2 T , it holds that the ratio of the
shares i and j in the HM-(; )-reduced game of coalition T is equal to the ratio of
their shares in the original game if
P
j2T j(N; v) 6= 0. More precisely the property says:
HM-(; )-reduced game property. Let :G ! IR be linear and positive for all
unanimity games and let  be a share function on G. Then the share function  sat-
ises the HM-(; )-reduced game property on a subgame closed subset C of G if for








j(N; v) 6= 0:
Observe that we allow that  and  are dierent ( satises the property stated above
with respect to the reduced game that is obtained by using  in equation (7)). The
reduced game property is considered to be a consistency property when a function
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satises its own reduced game property, i.e. for given function  a share function 
is considered to be consistent if  satises its own HM-(; )-reduced game property.
Now, for given  linear and positive for all unanimity games and given share function
, let C be a (; )-closed subset of G. Then Lemma 4.7 says that for any i 2 T and
(N; v)  C it holds that i(N; v)  0, i.e.  is nonnegative on C. Moreover this implies
that i(N; v) = 0 for all i 2 T when
P
j2T j(N; v) = 0. We therefore also require that
each player i 2 T gets an equal share in the own HM-(; )-reduced (T; vT;;) whenP
j2T j(N; v) = 0. This gives the following consistent reduced game property.
Axiom 4.8 (Consistent HM-(; )-reduced game property) Let :G ! IR be
linear and positive for all unanimity games. Then the share function  satises the
consistent HM-(; )-reduced game property on a (; )-closed subset C of G if for















j2T j(N; v) = 0:
The following consistency theorem says that for given  the corresponding share func-
tion  is consistent.
Theorem 4.9 Let :G ! IR with (N; v0) = 0 for every set of players N , be linear,
symmetric, null player independent and positive for all unanimity games. Then the
share function  on G as given in Corollary 2.2 satises the consistent HM-(; 
)-
reduced game property on any (; )-closed subset C of G containing all positively
scaled unanimity games.
Proof
Since  is linear and positive for all unanimity games we have that all HM-(; )-
reduced games exist and are uniquely determined. Since C is (; )-closed we have
that (T; vT;;

) 2 C and hence (T; vT;;)  0 for every T  N . Now consider some
game (N; v) 2 C. In case (N; v) = 0 we have that i (N; v) =
1
n
for all i 2 N .
Furthermore (N; v) = 0 implies with equation (7) that (T; v;T;








for all i 2 T for all T  N . So, (N; v) satises the consistent
HM-(; )-reduced game property.
It remains to consider the case that (N; v) > 0. Take T  N , T 6= ;. IfP
j2T 

j (N; v) = 0, then it follows from equation (7) that (T; v






for all i 2 T , so that the consistent HM-(; )-reduced game




j (N; v) > 0 and it follows from equation (7)
that also (T; v;T;

) > 0. Since (T [ T c; vT[T c) = (N; v) > 0, from Lemma
4.4 it follows that DP i (T; v
T;;) = P (T; vT;;

)   P (T n fig; vT;;

Tnfig ) = P
(T [
T c; vT[T c)   P
(T c; vT c)   P
((T n fig) [ T c; v(Tnfig)[Tc) + P
(T c; vT c) = P
(N; v)  
P (N n fig; vNnfig) = DP





















DP i (T; v
;T;)
(T; vT;;)
= NDP i (T; v
;T;) = i (T; v
;T;):
Thus, (N; v) satises the consistent HM-(; )-reduced game property. 2
Although for given  the share function  satises the consistent HM-(; )-reduced
game property, this property is not sucient to characterize . Therefore we need
an additional property. Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) characterize the Shapley
value by their reduced game property and the property of standardness for two person
games. Dragan (1996a,b) characterizes the Banzhaf value using a modied version
of Hart and Mas-Colell's reduced game, standardness for two person games and one
player eciency. Here we use a generalization of the standardness for two person




Axiom 4.10 (-standardness for two person games) Let :G ! IR be linear and
positive for all unanimity games and let C be a subset of G containing all positively
scaled unanimity games. A share function  is -standard for two person games on C










if (N; v) > 0
1
2
if (N; v) = 0:
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Observe that for the Shapley -function S(N; v) = v(N) the expression for i(N; v)









which corresponds to the property of standardness for two person games as used in
Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989). The next theorem states that for given  the share
function  of Corollary 2.2 is -standard for two person games.
Theorem 4.11 Let :G ! IR be linear, symmetric, and null player independent on G
and positive for all unanimity games. Then the share function  as given in Corollary
2.2 is -standard for two person games on any (; )-closed subset C of G containing
all positively scaled unanimity games.
Proof
By denition,  satises the -standardness for two person games for any two player
game (N; v) 2 C with (N; v) = 0. Now, suppose (N; v) is a game with jN j = 2 and





T2T + v(T )u
T P
T2T  ( v(T ))u
T , where T + = fT  N jv(T ) > 0g and T
  = fT  N jv(T ) < 0g.
So, v can de written as a linear combination of positively scaled unanimity games in
C. Since  is linear and  is -additive and is well dened for all positively scaled
unanimity games, it follows for i 2 N that





















The null player property of  implies that for any  > 0 it holds that j (N;u
T ) = 0
when j 62 T and symmetry implies that i (N;u
T ) = 1
jT j
when i 2 T . Applying
this for every nonempty T  N for the two player game (N; v) with N = fi; jg, we
obtain for i; j 2 N , j 6= i, that i (N; jv(fig)ju
fig) = 1, i (N; jv(fjg)ju
















N ); i 2 N:
Since  is linear and thus





(N; v)i (N; v) =
1
2
((N; v) + (N;v(fig)u
fig)  (N;v(fjg)u
fjg); i 2 N; j 2 N; j 6= i:
Since fjg is a null player in (N;ufig), it follows from the null player independency of 
and v(fig) = v(fig) that (N;v(fig)u
fig) = (N n fjg;v(fig)u
fig) = (fig; vfig).
Analogously we have that (N;v(fjg)u
fjg) = (fjg; vfjg) and thus
(N; v)i (N; v) =
1
2
((N; v) + (fig; vfig)  (fjg; vfjg); i 2 N; j 2 N; j 6= i:
Hence,  is -standard for two person games on C. 2
The Theorems 4.9 and 4.11 show that  satises the consistent reduced game property
and -standardness for two person games on any (; )-closed subset of g containing
all positively scaled unanimity games. The next theorem shows that a share function
 is uniquely determined by the consistent reduced game property and -standardness
for two person games.
Theorem 4.12 Let :G ! IR with (N; v0) = 0 for every set of players N , be linear,
symmetric, and null player independent on G and positive for all unanimity games. Let
 be a share function on G and C a (; )-closed subset of G containing all positively
scaled unanimity games. Then  is uniquely determined when  satises the consistent




Suppose that  is a share function on G satisfying the consistent reduced game property
and -standardness for two person games on C. By denition of share function we have
that (N; v) = 1 if jN j = 1. If jN j = 2, then (N; v) is uniquely determined by the
-standardness for two person games. Now, let (N; v) 2 C be such that jN j  3.
Because of Lemma 4.7 we must have that i(N; v)  0 for all i 2 N . Since  satises
the conditions of Theorem 4.3 all reduced games exist and belong to the (; )-closed
set C. When (N; v) = 0, then it follows from equation (7) that (T; vT;;) = 0
for all T  N . So, for any pair i; j 2 N , i 6= j, we have with T = fi; jg that
i(T; v
T;;) = j(T; v
T;;) = 1
2
because of the -standardness for two person games.
From the consistent HM-(; ) reduced game property and the nonnegativity of (N; v)
it then follows that i(N; v) = j(N; v) for any pair i; j 2 N and hence i(N; v) =
1
jN j
for all i 2 N and thus (N; v) is uniquely determined.
It remains to consider the case (N; v) > 0. We now proceed by induction on
jN j. For jN j  2, (N; v) is uniquely determined. Suppose that for k  3, (N; v) is
uniquely determined for any N , such that jN j = k   1. Now, suppose jN j = k. Since
 is a share function and thus
P
i2N i(N; v) = 1, at least one component of (N; v)
is positive. So, for some i 2 N , let i(N; v) > 0. Since C is (; )-closed, we have by
Lemma 4.7 that (N; v) is nonnegative and hence it follows that i(N; v)+j(N; v) > 0
for all j 2 N 0  Nnfig. Now, take T = fi; jg for some j 2 N 0. Then, applying equation
(7) for T = fi; jg and E = fig yields that
(fig; vT;;fig ) = (N n fjg; vNnfjg)i(N n fjg); vNnfjg): (10)
By the induction hypothesis we have that i(N n fjg); vNnfjg) is uniquely determined
and thus also (fig; vT;;fig ) is uniquely determined. Analogously we have that
(fjg; vT;;fjg ) = (N
0; vN 0)j(N
0; vN 0) (11)
is uniquely determined. Furthermore, we have that
(T; vT;;) = (N; v)(i(N; v) + j(N; v)) > 0:
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fig )  (fjg; v
T;;
fjg )
2(N; v)(i(N; v) + j(N; v))
: (12)





i(N; v) + j(N; v)
: (13)






fig )  (fjg; v
fi;jg;;
fjg )
2(N; v)(i(N; v) + j(N; v))
=
i(N; v)
i(N; v) + j(N; v)
;
which can be rewritten to the system of equations
j(N; v) = i(N; v) +
(fjg; v
fi;jg;;




; j 2 N n fig; (14)
where for all j 2 N n fig the (fjg; v
fi;jg;;
fjg ) and (fig; v
fi;jg;;
fig ) are uniquely deter-
mined by (10) and (11). So, with the condition
P
h2N h(N; v) = 1 the system (14) has
a unique solution. 2
Theorem 4.12 says that the the consistent HM-(; )-reduced game property and the
-standardness for two person games property uniquely determine the share function
 on a (; )-closed subset C of G containing all positively scaled unanimity games.
On the other hand, the Theorems 4.9 and 4.11 show that  satises both properties
on any (; )-closed subset of G containing all positively scaled unanimity games.
Hence we have the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.13 Let :G ! IR with (N; v0) = 0 for every set of players N , be linear,
symmetric, and null player independent on G and positive for all unanimity games.
Then the share function  as given in Corollary 2.2 is the unique share function that
satises the consistent HM-(; )-reduced game property and the -standardness for
two person games property on any (; )-closed subset C of G containing all positively
scaled unanimity games.
5 Concluding remarks
We conclude this paper by making some remarks on reduced game properties for share
mappings. A value mapping on C  G is a mapping F that assigns to every (N; v) 2 C
a set of n-dimensional real vectors F (N; v)  IRn each representing a distribution of
the payos over the players. A value mapping F is ecient on C  G if F (N; v) 
fx 2 IRn j
P
i2N xi = v(N)g for every (N; v) 2 C. An example of an ecient value







xi(N; v) = v(N); and
X
i2E
xi(N; v)  v(E) for all E  N
)
:
A share mapping on C  G is a mapping R which assigns to every (N; v) 2 C a set of
share vectors R(N; v)  SN := f 2 IRn j
P
i2N i = 1g for every (N; v) 2 C.








i  v(E) for all E  N
)
:
Note that RCc(N; v) = SN if (N; v) is a null game, i.e. if v = v0 with v0(E) = 0 for
all E  N . The core of a null game only contains the null vector with all components
equal to zero. If we distribute v0(N) = 0 then the shares assigned to the players do
not matter. Thus, R(N; v) = SN seems reasonable in this case.
In this paper a class of share functions that generalizes the Shapley share func-
tion and Banzhaf share function is characterized using a generalization of the reduced
games as introduced Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) in characterizing the Shapley
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value (adapted to share functions), and used by Dragan (1996a,b) in characterizing the
Banzhaf value. In a similar way the Core share mapping can be generalized as is done
in van den Brink and van der Laan (1999). They characterize a class of share mappings
containing the Core share mapping using a generalization of Davis and Maschler's re-
duced game property9 as used by Peleg (1986) in characterizing the Core. With each
share function in the class considered in the underlying paper there corresponds a
share mapping in the class considered in van den Brink and van der Laan (1999). The
Core share mapping coincides with what is called the Shapley share core. The class
considered also contains the Banzhaf share core which is related to the Banzhaf share
function is a similar way as the Shapley share core is related to the Shapley value.
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